Social science accounts have only recently begun to recognize "new governance" shifts, including, but not limited to, privatization occurring in public sector institutions (e.g., education, prisons, the military) and in the functioning of federal and state sector jobs. This article, which presents unique analyses of wages across time using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and retested on similarly representative data from the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample (IPUMS) and the American Community Survey (ACS), examines the extent to which these changes have generated significant inequalities for African Americans relative to whites. Most important, our results show that the relative racial parity in wages that once existed in public sector employment has eroded in the face of new governance, and racial inequalities for both men and women have intensified. Supplementary and decomposition analyses further highlight the potential escalation of discrimination as a core mechanism under new governance. Along with discussing the short-and long-term implications, we conclude by suggesting an important corrective to stratification scholarship-a corrective that highlights what structural transformation may mean for inequality and that recognizes important shifts that have made the public sector, much like the private sector, a locus of contemporary racial disadvantage.
were twice as likely to receive promotions into white collar managerial/executive and lower white collar administrative/technical jobs, making racial differences in that sector virtually indistinguishable (Byron 2010; Farley and Haaga 2005) . Moreover, and within the overwhelming majority of whiteand blue-collar occupational categories, African Americans in public sector employment have experienced significant earnings returns to human capital (Elliot and Smith 2005; Farley 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey and Stainback 2007 ) and access to reward-relevant structural attributes of jobs, such as job authority (Smith 2002; Wilson 1997) .
Despite its place in the amelioration of racial inequality and its role in the growth of the black middle class more generally, the organization of public sector work has witnessed significant transition and reform over the last decade (Ingraham, Seldon, and Moynihan 2000; Kamarck 2007; Light 1999) . Such change holds important implications for stratification scholarship-scholarship that has tended to either overlook the public sector or assume that the dynamics of racial/ethnic inequality, established as meaningful within private sector analyses, are simply not relevant. This is unfortunate. The influence of rapidly accelerating "new governance" in civil service work at state and federal levels appears to be fundamentally reshaping the employment landscape, including opportunities for, and inequality experienced by, racial and ethnic minorities.
Trends in public sector workplaces (Ingraham et al. 2000; Light 1999 ) have included the move from a traditional "public service" to a "business" model, thus extending the social organization of work that has historically been the basis of minority disadvantage in the private labor market (Kamarck 2007) . Especially pertinent here is increased on-site managerial/employer discretion, including the ability to set reward-relevant conditions of employment and determine employment status, and with less opportunity for aggrieved parties to contest managerial and supervisory decisions (Bowman and West 2007; Light 1999) . Alongside discretion, the public sector has witnessed a deformalization of rules and bureaucratic procedures that govern employment conditions (Bowman and West 2007; Kellough and Nigro 2006) , an elimination of employees' "property rights" tied to jobs (Condrey and Maranto 2001; Kuykendall and Facer 2002) , and a decreasing application of decades-old equal employment opportunity laws (Berman et al. 2006) .
In this article, we provide an empirical assessment of the consequences of these changes for African Americans. We first draw on recent work that documents key dimensions of new governance (e.g., Bowman and West 2007; Kamarck 2007 ) and build on a large and informative body of research on racial stratification and employment that focuses mostly on the private sector (e.g., Fernandez 1981; Roscigno 2007; Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 2005; Wilson and McBrier 2005) . The questions we raise, however, are even broader and more theoretically compelling. They speak to the resilient nature of inequality both across time and within the context of social, institutional, and structural change (see also, for instance, Raftery and Hout 1993; Tilly 1999; Weber 1968) .
Our analyses assess African American/white inequalities in wages in the public sector compared to the private sector across the "pre-governance" and "new governance" periods. In prior work (Wilson, Roscigno, and Huffman 2013) , we established that new governance changes have, over time, increased the likelihood of African American downward mobility in upper-tier public sector jobs. The current article extends that initial finding in several important way, including, but not limited to: (1) greater theoretical and historical elaboration on institutional changes, their timing, and likely implications for racial inequality; (2) extension to income specifically, which holds particular relevance for intergenerational transmissions of inequality; (3) a test of robustness by replication across two important data sources; and perhaps most important, (4) empirical specification, through both decomposition and supplemental analyses, of mediating effects of specific new governance changes.
Our modeling, which accounts for alternative explanations (i.e., differences in family background, human capital attributes, and unionization) and disentangles racial inequalities in public and private sector employment across time periods and for men and women separately, draws on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 2012), a representative sample of workers in the United States.
Supplementary analyses and a decomposition of effects further bolster our confidence that the reforms discussed are indeed the operant mechanisms. Finally, we retest and replicate our findings using data from the Integrated Public Use Data Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2010) , specifically the sample from 1990, and the [2005] [2006] [2007] American Community Survey (ACS) (U.S. Census Bureau 2005 . We conclude by discussing the resulting African American labor market disadvantage and the broader theoretical and empirical implications of the shifts, processes, and inequalities highlighted.
THE RISE OF "NEW GOVERNANCE" AND P R I V A T I Z A T I O N I N T H E P U B L I C S E C T O R
In the last two decades, public administration research has specified the shifting nature of public sector work from a "public service" and "career system" to one within which employment rights have been increasingly undermined. The "career system" (Bowman and West 2007) of employment that once existed-a system that evolved in the decades following the post-1965 civil rights era and that covered over 75 percent of the 18.5 million full-time public sector employees in the United States between 1975 and 1990 (Kamarck 2007 )-was governed by formal bureaucratic procedures and centralized decision making about work conditions, protections, and due process rights (Berman et al. 2006 ). Employees were "classified" or "non-exempt," meaning they had "property rights" in their jobs, such as: (1) tenure, which restricts worker termination to "just cause" reasons; and (2) the ability to invoke relatively elaborate equal employment opportunity laws to contest employer decisions when property rights (e.g., wages, job/division placement, harassment, and promotion) were threatened (Bowman and West 2007) .
Illustrative of the protections about which we speak and their coverage are figures for federal employees nationwide. At the height of public sector employment as a form of "career service," over 70 percent of non-exempt employees worked in tenure-bearing jobs (Bernhardt and Dresser 2002) and a similar proportion had the right to file a grievance and have a hearing/trial to resolve allegations of race-based unfair treatment (Malamud 1995) . The result was greater parity owing to the fact that African American men and women became more integrated into upper-tier managerial and professional positions (Cornwell and Kellough 1994; Kellough 1990; Lewis 1987; Lewis and Nice 1994) .
Change has occurred, however, in the form of a "reinventing government" agenda-an agenda that has received bipartisan backing-and a corresponding push toward "new governance" and privatization logics in how federal and state sector organizations operate (Kamarck 2007) . Sweeping changes in the work conditions of full-time government workers, in fact, have commenced over the last two decades. Such changes, as summarized in Table 1 on a state-by-state basis and across major federal agencies, include: (1) whether declassified status and the degree of decentralization of supervisory decisions over terms of employment were expanded; (2) whether at-will employment expanded; and (3) if the range of grievance-eligible employment issues contracted and the range of such issues.
The extent of reform, of course, has varied across units of the state and federal government. The proportion of public sector positions converted to at-will, for instance, doubled by 2007 to cover all employees in Texas and 72 percent in Georgia, and tripled to cover 48 percent in Idaho, 40 percent in Kansas, and 35 percent in Colorado. Changes in other states, on the other hand, have been nonexistent or barely perceptible (e.g., 5 percent in Tennessee and 10 percent in Connecticut). On the federal side, congressional approval was sought and garnered over the last decade to use new governance as a template for government-wide change. This impacted approximately 45 percent of full-time government workers nationwide, and especially new workers (i.e., approximately 65 percent among those hired since 2000) (Kamarck 2007) .
The changes we are discussing are predicated on the logic of private sector "bottom line" principles, placing a premium on increasing performance, efficiency, and results (Bowman and West 2007;  Hays and Sowa 2006). Altering public sector work so that it is run like a business (Hays and Sowa 2006) and making it more incentive laden, it is argued, enhances individual-and department-level productivity and increases the flexibility of managers to make efficiency-mandated personnel adjustments. This has occurred at a time when a more malleable public sector is perceived of as needed in the face of rapid and broader social change (Wilson 2006) . Notable is that the very changes, conditions, and new terms of public sector employment we are describing are precisely those seen as responsible for deeply entrenched levels of racial inequality in the private sector. In fact, a hallmark of the new governance movement that may portend "the end of government work as we know it" (Kamarck 2007:126) is the designation of employees as "declassified" or "exempt." Here, decentralization of a highly bureaucratized work environment increases the on-site discretionary decision-making power of managers to determine the conditions of work and employment. Moreover, this is occurring at a time when, also pursuant to new governance, legal avenues to contest managerial decisions have been reduced (Bowman and West 2007; Leicht and Fennell 2001) .
In losing property interests, exempt workers become employees "at will" (Malamud 1995) who, absent narrowly carved public policy exceptions covered by EEO law (Stainback and TomaskovicDevey 2012) , can be terminated for "any or not reason at all" (Villemez and Bridges 1994) . Emblematic of such workplace vulnerability, the proportion of new federal employees hired into tenure-bearing jobs in 2006 dipped to approximately 50 percent (Wilson 2006 ) and the proportion who had rights to file a grievance and/or have a hearing to resolve allegations of unfair treatment fell to approximately 50 percent (Bernhardt and Dresser 2002) .
Public sector workers now find themselves at a crossroads, increasingly vulnerable to termination, reductions to part-time status, or involuntary work furlough with little or no notice, and with little in the way of procedural safeguards to contest employer decisions. Similarly, they have fewer overall rights to contest the pay or promotional decisions impacting the terms of their employment. This includes managers who, in the public sector, are similar to non-managers and subject to peer performance reviews and organizational changes along the lines we are discussing (Bowman and West 2007) . Research has been conspicuously silent on the inequalityrelated implications of these public sector changes and what they mean particularly for racial disadvantage. Racial Income Inequality and Public Sector Privatization 167
expectations are informed by broader sociological questions surrounding structural transformation, social closure processes, and stratification, as well as specific streams of research on the organization of work and racial inequality. One assumption, building on Max Weber (1968) and undergirding much stratification scholarship, views bureaucratic formality, constraint, and rational (i.e., non-ascriptively based) action as the dominant organizational and societal trend. As such, the very possibility that structural change may move away from the bureaucratic form Weber envisioned and exacerbate ascriptive inequalities is rarely considered. It is for this reason that we draw on conceptions that acknowledge the possibility that inequality may be maintained or even intensified in the face of social change.
It is within the context of organizational change and concerns about "bottom-line" efficiency, downsizing (Haveman, Broschak, and Cohen 2009; Kalev 2014) , and precarious nonstandard work arrangements (Kalleberg 2011 ) that we recognize the possibility of growing racial inequality and the organizational sources of it. Relevant in this regard is Charles Tilly's (1999) now seminal discussion of "durable inequality," which raises the question of how hierarchy reproduces itself through mechanisms (i.e., social closure, opportunity hoarding) that may be malleable, more or less, in the face of rigid or shifting structures. Adrian Raftery and Michael Hout (1993) make a similar case relative to educational contexts, where inequalities are often effectively maintained or even intensified in the face of institutional or organizational changes (see also Alon 2009 ). Such accounts point to inequality's resilience in the face of structural transformations and ask what the consequences are.
Beyond the possibility that change leads to greater inequality, it is also essential to interrogate the more specific and often taken-for-granted assumption that bureaucratic shifts and structures are necessarily unidirectional or inherently protective. To be sure, the introduction of formalized, bureaucratic policy and procedure, especially when coupled with vigilant public sector oversight, helped curtail biases and discrimination beginning in 1960s (Dobbin 2011) . Discrimination even in the public sector, however, hardly disappeared (Byron 2010) . In fact, earlier lines of inequality research documented racial divisions of labor across public and private economic sectors-divisions of labor that should be conceived of as politically mediated (e.g., through civil rights protections, more or less) and characterized by the restriction of blacks to inferior wage and mobility trajectories (Browne and Erie 1981; Collins 1997; Freeman 1977; Zipp 1994) .
These earlier insights, along with more recent research denoting (1) a de-bureaucratization of organizational policies, procedures, and protections owing to global competition, outsourcing, and the decline of unions (e.g., Crowley and Hodson 2014) , and (2) ways in which bureaucratic formality itself might exacerbate ascribed inequalities through systematic structural biases (e.g., Kalev 2014) and policy/procedural malleability at the hands of gatekeepers (e.g., Roscigno 2011), suggest that a more dynamic, politically informed conception of organizational change, bureaucracy, and their consequences is warranted. This is indeed our aim, guided by the theoretical strands above as well as literatures on racial inequality, private sector employment, and core processes that are likely increasingly relevant to the public sector.
Inequality in the face of new governance should not, in our view, be understood apart from evolving conceptions of race and "racial formation" (Omi and Winant 1994; Saperstein, Penner, and Light 2013) . New governance changes, in fact, can be seen as constituting a set of organizational practices that structure and reify levels of racial inequality. The historically contingent and inequality-relevant concept of race and how it is perceived relative to individual-and group-level attributes form crucial underpinnings of structural arrangements necessary to produce assumed results (i.e., maximum efficiency, productivity, etc.). Indeed, we see race as embedded in and emboldened by not only recent bureaucratic changes, but also by incarnations of discrimination that have become prominent in the post-1965 civil rights era.
Variously labeled "modern racism" (Pettigrew 1985) , "laissez-faire racism" (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997) , and "color-blind racism" (Bonilla-Silva 2002) , dominant formulations emphasize the situational, institutional, and ostensibly non-racial character of discrimination that continues to operate in work settings where meritocratic ideologies, supported by seemingly neutral formalized procedures and rules, prevail. Here, decisions by employers-such as those involving the distribution of earnings-are rendered in contexts replete with discourses of open opportunity and principles of fair play. Yet, structural disadvantages in things like job placement and tenure (Kalev 2014) , along with significant supervisory discretion and limited accountability (Light, Roscigno, and Kalev 2011; Stainback, Robinson, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2005) allow unequal allocations, discrimination, and inequality to persist.
Research has documented that crucial to the "subtle dynamics of contemporary discrimination" (Wilson and McBrier 2005:307) is the latitude/discretion employers exercise over workers even in the face of formal bureaucratic rules (Roscigno 2011; Smith 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey and Stainback 2007) . Flexibility and discretion in distributing socioeconomic rewards-such as earnings-is undoubtedly exercised for the purpose of facilitating organizational objectives. Such objectives include achieving "bottom line" financial results as well as maintaining a stable and productive workforce (TomaskovicDevey et. al 2005) . Yet, such contexts also offer relatively free reign to social psychological forms of "confirmatory attribution bias" (Pettigrew and Martin 1987) , "statistical discrimination" (TomaskovicDevey and Skaggs 1999), and "particularism" (Kluegel 1978 ). Here we are referring to a range of vague and often difficult to measure informal/personal characteristics, such as perceived loyalty, trustworthiness, and leadership potential, that often constitute a critical basis of employers' reward allocation decisions. Given patterns of workplace segregation, African Americans are disadvantaged relative to their white counterparts in demonstrating such attributes (Kluegel 1978; Smith 2002; Wilson 1997) .
Prior work likewise suggests that employers' latitude in decision making enables subtle biases in performance evaluations-the proximate causes of wage trajectories. First, as John Fernandez (1981) and Thomas Pettigrew and Joanne Martin (1987) establish, employers' unchecked assigning of African Americans to racially delineated/segregated work groups-groups supervised and evaluated by fellow racial group members-can leave minority workers prone to evaluation-relevant "information bias," a form of statistical discrimination in which their character and performance records are viewed as less credible than those of white peers. Sharon Collins (1997) and George Wilson (1997) note that the channeling of African Americans to "racialized labor" (i.e., racially delineated job tasks that involve providing services to African American customers/clients) likewise renders them susceptible to such bias-bias that tends to reaffirm negative stereotypes pertaining to suitability and productivity. Finally and relatedly, several authors maintain that segregation patterns along with the tendency to subordinate African Americans to whites in authority hierarchies limit opportunities to demonstrate characteristics that matter (Kalev 2009; Smith 2002; Wilson, West, and Sakura-Lemessy1999) .
Such streams of research, especially when coupled with recognition of specific public sector reforms over the last decade, provide a firm basis for the expectation that the public sector is declining as a historically important, more equitable occupational niche for African Americans and that racial wage inequalities are intensifying. Specifically, pursuant to new governance reforms, the push toward privatization and associated discretion-based employment practices, one should expect a growing racial wage gap in the public sector between earlier and reform periods. We tackle this by systematically comparing public sector patterns to those observed in the private sector across time, and taking into account alternative explanations (e.g., changes in unionization, group disparities in human capital, etc.). We also consider the possibility of gender variations by race given that the structural and interactional bases of inequality may vary (Browne and Misra 2003) . Irrespective of race, for instance, we know that women suffer from a shared "penalty," tied to segregation (England 1992; Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012) and the persistence of gender-based stereotypes (e.g., commitment to work and fitness for lengthy tasks) (Browne and Kennelly 1999; Browne and Misra 2003) . Such penalties, however, may be distinct, and with African American women experiencing a "double disadvantage" (Bobo and Massagli 2001; Ortiz and Roscigno 2009 ).
D A T A A N D M E A S U R E M E N T
Our analyses draw on a pooled sample of individuals who are either "heads of household" or "spouses" in the PSID at two five-year time periods, the "pre-governance" period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and the "new governance" period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . The pre-governance cohort consists of those between the ages of 18 and 50 who were employed full time or part time in a non-self-employed capacity continuously between 1986 and 1990 in either the private or public sector, before new governance took hold at either state or federal levels (Leicht and Fennell 2001) . The new governance cohort consists of a pooled sample of workers between the ages of 18 and 50 who were employed full time or part time in a non-self-employed capacity continuously between 2003 and 2007 as new governance work arrangements at both state and federal levels became prevalent. Indeed, and according to detailed historical accounts from both administrative and political science, 2003-2007 represents a time period characterized by unprecedented acceleration and implementation of new governance. During this period, over half of the 50 states and four of the five largest federal agencies incorporated dimensions of new governance (Morgan and Cook 2014).
All respondents in the pre-governance and new governance cohorts are tracked pursuant to: (1) being a "splitoff" (i.e., being previously a family member in the PSID and, thus, were not tracked, who established their own household), or (2) becoming a spouse of a splitoff; or (3) being a newly recruited sample member to address sample attrition. The PSID has long oversampled African Americans in an attempt to create sufficient sample sizes that allow meaningful comparisons in quantitative analyses. Sample weights are used in all analyses to account for oversampling, thus making the weighted sample nationally representative. The application of the criteria above resulted in sample sizes of 7,512 and 7,448 in the pre-reform and reform cohorts, respectively. Specific breakdowns by gender and public versus private sector distinctions are reported in Table 2 .
The use of the PSID data, beyond the comparative leverage it offers relative to time, racial groups, and gender, is important because they: (1) represent true panel data, allowing us to track individuals over time; (2) allow for specific sector measures, including private versus public but also the disaggregation of federal from state/local public sector employment; and (3) help account for alternative explanations, the most prominent being racial variations in human capital, family background, and changes in unionization.
1 Given a somewhat limited sample size, however, we retest core findings (see Appendix Table A1 ) on a similarly representative and larger sample derived from the Integrated Public Use Data Series (IPUMS), specifically the 5 percent IPUMS sample from 1990 and the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (ACS). Even though this is not panel data and does not allow for the disaggregation of state/local versus federal public sector employment, the retest it offers bolsters confidence in the robustness of our core results from the PSID panel data and the conclusions we draw from them. 1 The PSID is the preferred data set for several reasons. First, it has a longitudinal design. The 1986 The -1990 The and 2003 analyzed constitute true cohorts who work only in either the public or private sector, and thus, the findings represent pure "sector effects." The IPUMS and ACS are cross-sectional and capture individuals whose work histories are mixed in terms of having moved between the public and private sectors. Second, the PSID contains a wider range of theoretically important variables, including measures of work commitment and union status. Third, the PSID has a measure of wages that is preferred: it permits an accurate rendering of "hourly wages," generally considered the most telling measure of wage inequality (Kaufman 2010 Dependent Variable Our outcome of interest is hourly wages in the final year in which each respondent (pre-reform cohort-1990; reform cohort-2007) was tracked in this study. Hourly wage is calculated as the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours worked. The denominator of this measure is the product of weeks worked in the year and the average number of hours worked per week. The effect of inflation on wages was removed by multiplying the measure by the Consumer Price Index, producing an hourly wage variable expressed in constant 2007 dollars. To facilitate ease of interpretation, we present hourly wages in raw dollars and all results reported are non-logged. To ensure that results are not a product of statistical outliers, a parallel set of analyses were run on the natural log version. Findings in this regard are nearly identical to those reported in tables that follow.
Race and Public/Private Distinctions
Race is coded in dichotomous fashion (1 ¼ African American, 0 ¼ white) to capture aggregate wage inequalities between public and private sectors and across periods. We measure sector discretely as public (¼ 1) versus private (¼ 0) in the first portion of our analyses to capture overall inequalities. A careful reading of the literature, however, suggests that patterns of public sector change and their implications for racial inequality may be more evident in federal public sector jobs, and for several reasons: (1) it has been within federal public service establishments that reforms have been more pronounced (Bowman and West 2007; Hays and Sowa 2006) ; (2) it is within federal public sector employment that African Americans have historically received the greatest bureaucratic protections in hiring, firing/termination, promotion, and wage scales (Dobbin 2011) ; and (3) several scholars have noted that there may be uneven application and oversight depending on local conditions and norms (Burstein 1985; Edsall and Edsall 1991) . Given potential variations, our main analyses (see Table 4 ) treat federal versus state/local public sectors discretely (private ¼ referent).
Human Capital
We account for human capital differences with a set of controls. The first is educational attainment, represented by two dummy variables: "college degree" and "post-college degree." Respondents with a high school degree or less serve as the reference category.
3 Second, prior research suggests that attendance at work is a good indicator of job commitment (Mueller, Wallace, and Price, 1992) . Commitment is thus included and measured as the number of job absences in the last year the respondents was included in the sample. We reverse coded this indicator so that higher scores reflect greater job commitment (i.e., fewer absences). Specifically, 0 absences are coded 6, 4 to 7 absences are coded 5, 8 to 11 absences are coded 4, 12 to 15 absences are coded 3, 15 to 18 absences are coded 2, 19 to 22 absences are coded 1, and more than 22 absences are coded 0. Workforce experience, arguably important for wage returns, is measured as the number of full-time years in the labor force since age 18. And, lastly, since a worker's physical capacity is treated as a meaningful human capital characteristic (Becker 1964) , respondents who said they had "health problems that limited their capacity to work" were coded 1 and all others were coded 0.
Family/Household Background Several family/household variables are included as well. First, sociologists (Ahituv and Lerman 2007) have documented that marital status shapes earnings prospects. Among women, single mothers earn more than those who are married. Among men, those married tend to earn more than those who are single (coded 1 ¼ married, 0 ¼ unmarried). We also include number of children in the household, another attribute positively related to earnings (Ahituv and Tienda 2004; Caucutt, Gurner, and Knowles 2002) .
Job/Labor Market Attributes
Several potentially influential job and labor market characteristics are likewise accounted for. First, we include an indicator of union status of the job (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no). Second, we take into consideration the possibility that public sector changes may, in fact, operate uniquely across the occupational hierarchy. For this reason we select one privileged, white-collar census-based occupational category-"managers/administrators" (pre-reform) and "managers" (reform)-for inclusion, with others serving as the reference category.
4 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for these and other variables drawn from the PSID sample.
Temporal and Sociodemographic Considerations
Age of respondent is included as a control, and we use sampling weights in all reported analyses. Sample weights ensure representativeness across cohorts as well as across sectors, thereby precluding the possibility that findings are being driven by compositional differences in the PSID sample. These weights are utilized in all analyses reported, including the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses, the multivariate technique of choice.
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A N A L Y T I C S T R A T E G Y A N D R E S U L T S
Following a descriptive account of racial wage inequalities by gender across public and private sectors over time (Figure 1) , OLS regressions are performed on a pooled sample of African Americans and whites, separated for men and women, and disentangled for pre-new governance and new governance cohorts (Table 4) . 6 We retest nearly identical models for the sake of robustness on an alternative data source, the PIMS, and report this in the Appendix (see Table A1 ). 4 Prior to 2001, the PSID was keyed to the 1970 Census Occupational Scheme and after it was coded to the 2000 Census occupational scheme. 5 All analyses were reestimated without using the PSID weights. Results were similar to those reported in this study. Overall, this similarity is an indication that the statistical model used is properly specified. In addition, differences in slopes between African Americans and whites by gender across the public and private sectors during the pre-reform and reform periods were compared, and, in all cases, they were found to be similar. Further, a parallel set of all analyses were performed in which the dependent variable assumed a natural logarithmic transformation. In all cases, results were consistent with those reported in this study. 6 We undertook efforts to address sample selectivity bias. In particular, we were concerned with the possibility that civil rights laws and more equitable treatment have caused highly skilled African Americans to gravitate towards the private sector during the reform period. Based on additional analyses, there appears to be no evidence of this kind of selection bias built into the sample. In particular, among both men and women t-tests for differences between African Americans and whites in skill levels-indexed by To address public sector patterns of wage inequality and the issue of mechanisms more directly, we also: (1) run supplementary analyses of the impact of reform generally (see Figure 2a ) and specific reforms (see Figure 2b ), controlling for alternative explanations noted previously; and (2) decompose our main findings from Table 4 in a manner that denotes the portion of the observed inequality gaps that are explained by human capital, family background, and other labor market indicators versus potential changes in race-specific bias and discrimination over time (Table 5) . A "purer" sectoral analysis of race-based wage inequalities among the cohorts necessitates that analyses focus on the final year (i.e., 1990 and 2007) in which respondents are tracked. This ensures that the comparisons being made are between those that have been employed in a given sector for the entire period being considered. Figure 1 reports average wage gaps in 2007 "real dollars" among white men and women relative to their African American and gender counterparts across the public and private sectors and during the pre-reform and reform periods.
Racial Wage Inequality in Public and Private Sectors
7 T-tests for group differences indicate that, for both gender groups, the relative racial parity in hourly wages in the public sector has disintegrated over time. The earnings gap favoring whites in the private sector is significant (p < .001) in both periods. In contrast, among men, the gap in hourly wages favoring whites in the public sector is significant (p < .01), but only in the new governance period.
Among women a similar pattern emerges, although racial differences are somewhat less pronounced. While the wage gap between white and black women in the private sector is significant (p < .05) in both periods, white women are only advantaged in the public sector during the new governance period (p < .05).
8 It thus appears from these initial findings that public sector racial level of educational attainment and job commitment-were not significant in either the prereform or reform periods. In addition, the proportion of African Americans with "post-college" education among men (approximately 20 percent) and women (approximately 20 percent) were identical in the pre-reform and reform cohorts. Finally, we searched for sample selectivity by performing a Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) . First, we predict the probability of working in the public sector with a probit model. Second, we construct an inverse Mills ratio by dividing the probability density function by the cumulative distribution function based on this model, yielding the hazard of nonselection. Third, we enter the hazard in our substantive equation for hourly wages. The strongest selection model requires variables that predict the probability of selection and are associated with the substantive outcome, but only through the selection process. Thus, one exogeneous instrumental variable-wealth possession-was selected in the employment equation but not the wage equation. Wealth possession is synonymous with non-labor force income exogenously, so that it affects the kind of work performed but not wages earned. Findings with the inclusion of the Heckman procedure to control for selectivity did not alter the pattern of substantive findings across the prereform or reform periods. 7 We ran additional analyses breaking up the sample into finer delineations surrounding census-based occupational categories. The core results and patterns of racial disadvantage presented operated across all occupational categories, making it unduly burdensome to present results by occupational category.
inequalities have indeed intensified for women and men. In fact, and notably, the increasing public sector racial disadvantages reported are escalating toward those we find consistently over time in private sector employment. Table 4 reports the results for OLS regressions for wages of African American and white men and women across periods and economic sectors. Among each cohort (i.e., pre-new governance and new governance), the race coefficient captures the extent of wage inequality in the private sector. Thus, the main effect of race should be interpreted as the penalty for being African American in the private sector.
Analyses of Race-Gender Wage Inequalities Across Time
Pubic sector racial wage inequality is equal to the sum of the race coefficient and the coefficient of the interaction term (i.e., race x federal public sector). The reader should interpret the interaction itself as the potential "boost" that African Americans receive in public compared to private sector work. Although the baseline effects of local/state-level public-sector employment are generally similar to federal public sector employment in our modeling, these effects are weaker than we expected and nonsignificant. Interactions between race and local/state public-sector employment (not reported) were likewise generally in the expected direction, although nonsignificant.
Consistent with predictions, the relative wage parity achieved by African American men in the public sector during the earlier pre-governance period erodes in the later period, and racial inequality intensifies. Specifically, in the pre-governance period, African American men were highly disadvantaged in the private sector earnings (b ¼ -$3.31, p < .001), yet received a robust public sector wage "boost," particularly in federal public sector employment (b ¼ $2.35, p < .001). This results in a nonsignificant public sector racial wage gap. In the new governance period, African American men were similarly highly disadvantaged within the private sector in earnings attainment (b ¼ -$3.45, p < .001). Notably, the statistically significant race x public sector interaction (b ¼ $1.25, p < .05) indicates a less pronounced public sector wage protection over time. The results above are largely similar for women and indicate a generally parallel race-based pattern, although the adverse effects of public sector reforms seem more pronounced among men. In the pre-governance period, African American women were moderately disadvantaged in the private sector in hourly wages compared to their white female counterparts (b ¼ -$2.08, p < .01). Employment in the public sector, on the other hand, netted higher wages (b ¼ $1.95, p < .01). This public sector wage premium essentially offsets African American women's disadvantage in the private sector, resulting in a statistically nonsignificant earnings gap. In the new governance period, African American women experienced a similarly moderate private sector wage disadvantage (b ¼ $-2.10, p < .01) that is only partially offset in the public sector. In fact, during the new governance period, the public sector wage "boost" is smaller than in the earlier period (b ¼ $1.20, p < .05), resulting in a modest but significant racial disadvantage in earnings among women. Note: b ¼ real dollars *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
For men and women, racial wage inequalities seem both apparent and relatively consistent in private sector employment. The public sector, in comparison, saw greater racial parity early on-parity that eroded during the era of "new governance" public sector reforms. Moreover, such findings are robust in parallel analyses that draw on the 1990 IPUMS and 2005-2007 ACS data. In this supplementary analysis and retest, reported in the Appendix (see Table A1 ), we find largely consistent patterns of racial disadvantage in private sector employment, and increasing racial inequalities among men and women in public sector employment across time.
Background indicators and controls are consistent with what one might expect. Higher levels of human capital and larger family size increase hourly wages for all race/gender subgroups across both the pre-governance and new governance periods. The one conspicuous and nonsignificant finding has to do with union status. We examined this further by estimating separate equations for the public sector subsample and across both time periods. These analyses explored main effects as well as a race-union interaction term. Results indicated that unionization does not operate differently across racial groups in either time period (results available upon request).
The Unique Impact of Public Sector Reforms
Whether increasing public sector racial inequalities can be interpreted as a function of new governance reforms and their consequences for diminished workplace protections and intensified supervisory discretion necessitates, of course, further and more specific analyses. With this in mind, we ran additional analyses to more clearly establish whether the mechanisms (i.e., privatization-based policy shifts) posited as causally central account for the observed and growing public sector racial wage gaps.
These analyses, summarized for brevity in Figure 2a and 2b, control for other potential explanations reported in our earlier modeling. Instead of a simple dichotomous indicator of public versus private, we: (1) disaggregated states and federal agencies into those that instituted low, moderate, and high levels of overall reform and analyzed the association with racial wage inequalities (see Figure 2a) , and (2) examined how racial wage inequalities vary more systematically by the three specific new Racial Income Inequality and Public Sector Privatization 177 governance changes discussed earlier (i.e., decentralization, at-will employment, and grievable issues) (see Figure 2b) . Figure 2a reports racial wage inequalities within contexts of low, medium, and high new governance adoption. The patterns reported offer significant support for the assertion that reforms discussed are at least partially responsible for emerging racial inequalities specified earlier. First, within the modeling on which this figure is based, between 40 and 55 percent of the public sector inequalities reported earlier are explained with the inclusion of these general indicators. Secondly, and as seen in the figure, states/agencies that experienced the greatest level of new governance reform have the largest racial wage gaps ($3.23) for men, followed by those with "moderate" reform ($2.74), and then those with no or low reform ($1.13). A similar pattern emerges for women, although racial gaps at all levels are lower. The wage gap in "high" reform states/agencies is $1.56, in "moderate" states/agencies it is $1.15, and in "low" adoption states/agencies it is $.075. Figure 2b dissects these patterns in even more detailed fashion, analyzing the public sector racial wage gap relative to centralized decision making and issues such as human capital, unionization, and family background, each of which is plausibly connected to wage setting and salary adjustments. Although at-will employment is less intuitively connected to wages, it may be related indirectly, especially if higher status (and thus better compensated) African Americans and/or their jobs have been disparately impacted in the course of public sector reforms and terminations.
The patterns reported in Figure 2b strongly suggest that all three reforms have been consequential. Among men, for instance, the racial wage gap of $1.78 where decentralization is "low" jumps to $3.31 in states and federal agencies where decentralization is "high." For women, the racial gap similarly climbs with decentralization from $1.30 to $1.73. A parallel pattern is apparent when examining reforms surrounding grievable issues and the growing implementation of at-will employment. Decomposing Wage Gaps and Recognizing Potential Discrimination Beyond attempting to assess the general consequences of reforms, it is also important to decompose the effects reported and in a manner that helps clarify the degree to which racial inequalities result from the attributes people bring to the labor market versus potential evaluative biases or discrimination that might be occurring in the face of new governance. To this end, and in an effort to assess the relative contribution in evaluations (intercepts and slopes) and characteristics (means) to the observed racial wage gaps, we undertake regression decomposition. Using the regression slopes from Table 4 and means (Table 3) , racial disparities in hourly wages are decomposed based on the following formula (Jones and Kelley 1984:330) :
Whereas the subscripts w and aa refer to white and African American, respectively, Y is the mean of logged earnings, a is the y-intercept, b is the slope, and X is the mean of a predictor. The first term on the right side of the equation is the portion of the wage gap due to "group membership." The second term on the right side of the equation is the portion of the wage gap due to differences in rates of return. The third term on the right side of the equation represents the interaction term between worker characteristics and their evaluation. The fourth term on the right side of the equation is the portion of the wage gap due to "non-discriminatory" differences in worker attributes (e.g., tenure) and human capital characteristics (e.g., education). The group membership term and the returns term are combined and reported as the "potential discrimination" component-a component that assumes a portion of the wage gap is due new governance changes and their consequences for bias and discrimination. The size of the fourth or "means" component designates the expected gap (or non-discriminatory component) between African Americans and white wages if African Americans entered the labor market with characteristics similar to those of whites. Table 5 reports the results of our decomposition across economic sectors and among pregovernance and new governance cohorts. For purposes of simplicity, the non-discriminatory and possible discriminatory components are presented as percentages of the total earnings gap in hourly earnings. Possible discrimination levels captured in our modeling strategy remain relatively constant in the private sector across periods. Much more notable are shifts in the public sector across time.
Here we find sizeable leaps across periods, and with discrimination or at least possible discrimination comprising a much larger explanatory component of the racial wage gaps for both men and women. Among men employed in the federal public sector jobs during the pre-governance period, the proportion of the racial wage gap that can be more plausibly attributed to bias and discrimination is 31 percent. This increases to 54 percent during the reform period. Among men employed in the private sector during the pre-governance period, this proportion is 47 percent and this increases more moderately to 57 over time. For women in federal public employment during the pre-governance period, the proportion of the racial earnings gap that is more easily attributed to bias and discrimination is 18 percent and this increases to 38 percent during the new governance period. Such findings, when interpreted alongside our main findings (Table 4 ) and our analyses of specific public sector reforms and their implications for inequality (Figures 2a and 2b) , highlight not only the degree to which racial inequality in the pubic sector has intensified in the face of new governance reforms, but also plausible reasons as to why.
C O N C L U S I O N S Analyses of inequality, often drawing on depictions of increasingly bureaucratized and thus meritbased organizations and institutions, have tended to assume that: (1) social change and associated structural transformations will reduce ascriptively based inequalities, or (2) that the public sector-a sector traditionally characterized by greater bureaucratic formality and thus racial equity-is somehow impervious to the dynamics of racial inequality typically attributed to and documented within private sector employment. Alternative strands of theory (e.g., Tilly 1999) instead point to the durable and resilient nature of inequality within organizations, across time and in the face of social and structural transformation, and recent work (e.g., Kalev 2014; Roscigno 2011) suggests that more nuanced conceptions of bureaucratic formality and inequality are warranted. The main challenge for social scientists-and indeed the central aim of this article-is to examine if and how the patterning of inequality is altered relative to institutional and organizational change, and why.
Our core findings suggest that the new governance-based "business model" adopted by the public sector over the last decade-a model characterized by increasingly discretion-based employment practiceshas generated significant inequalities for African American men and women. Indeed, relative parity between African Americans and whites in public sector wages during the pre-governance period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) eroded during the new governance period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Thus, racial inequality has intensified, and to a point wherein public sector racial inequalities have begun to approach levels historically and contemporarily witnessed in private sector employment. Notably, this pattern holds especially for men but women as well. The "double disadvantage" experienced by African American women is partially countered by the gender penalty experienced by white women. African American men, however, are unique in their gender group in suffering a penalty-a more strictly racial one-which widens inequities.
Our findings pertaining to wage inequalities, taken alongside our prior work on downward mobility (Wilson et al. 2013) , are important and signal the collapse of the public sector as the long-standing and more equitable occupational niche for African Americans, not to mention a reversal of gains made since the civil rights era. We base this on the findings presented as well as the recognition that new governance is hardly a transitory phenomenon. Politically bipartisan support has generated "unbridled momentum for the new governance agenda" (Kamarck 2007:24) -an agenda that has sought reforms to help public institutions "work better and cost less" by downsizing, enacting decentralized authority, introducing competition, and focusing more on results and less on formal rules (Kamarck 2007) . Such changes have obvious implications for the public sector and its workers, the core focus of this article, but also, for instance, public education (e.g., Renzulli and Roscigno 2007) and the growing prison complex (Dolovich 2009 ) in the United States, each of which have similarly witnessed sweeping changes encompassing a more competitive, business and result-centered logic. Sociological attention to such dynamics and what they mean for group inequalities, however, remains lacking.
The structural changes and inequalities we are discussing undoubtedly translate into a series of longterm disadvantages for African Americans-disadvantages that may have already commenced. African Americans, unlike whites, have no alternative location or sector in the American labor market in which to achieve equitable earnings. In addition, the relatively negligible accumulation of wealth among African Americans makes it uniquely difficult to compensate for a decline in access to financial resources (Conley 1999; Oliver and Shapiro 1995) . Finally, declining access to resources-wrought in part by the implementation of new governance-threatens the decades-old ability of African Americans in the public sector to accumulate the financial means to blunt discrimination and pave the way for the orderly transmission of economic status to the next generation. The intergenerational transfer of economic status is indeed a critical stratification-based phenomenon that has become a hallmark of the public sector for African Americans in the civil rights era (Hout 1984; Landry and Marsh 2011) .
Assuming that new governance and its associated privatization pressures continue, it is necessary to implement protections to address the deleterious impact reported in our findings. Specifically, we recommend a strategy that balances the fundamental thrust of new governance (i.e., its "business model" orientation emphasizing "bottom line" results and efficient practices) with the need to achieve racial equity in socioeconomic outcomes such as earnings. Especially important in this compromise, we believe, is diversity accountability and opportunities to contest managerial discretion in employment practices. Sociological research, in fact, documents that the negative impact of formalized bias and discretionary practices are best blunted if minority workers can resort to at least one layer of formal grievance with professional counsel as part of due process (Kalev 2014; Kalev and Dobbin 2006) . Incorporating such procedural safeguards and establishing formal review and oversight boards with sanctioning and monitoring capability may help to ensure a significant measure of equity within the constraints of an employment system that has traditionally treated it as a low priority.
We hope our findings and attention to new governance reforms and what they entail will reorient sociologists about the status of the public sector as a locus of racial disadvantage. The public sector and the extent of racial inequality generated should, in fact, be conceived of as fluid and evolving rather than static and monolithic. New governance changes represent merely a conspicuous example of this fluidity. Less dramatic examples-for instance, those rooted in political philosophy that have lent themselves to shaping the size of government, or legal doctrine used to determine the scope of equal employment opportunity protections-have abounded throughout the post-1965 civil rights era (Burstein 1985; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Malamud 1995) .
Alternative theoretical formulations and further analyses are clearly warranted. Particularly pertinent will be the incorporation of theoretical/conceptual tools, such as "social closure," which may prod needed attention toward core mechanisms. Indeed, and noteworthy, is that Weber (1968) identified a factual situation remarkably similar to that experienced by African Americans in the public sector pursuant to new governance-i.e., the devaluation of well-rewarded positions, particularly when there are no legitimate alternatives to achieve similar rewards-as a "fundamental scenario" that should invoke more specific closure analysis. No less important would be orienting frameworks that do not necessarily assume public sector or bureaucratic protections or even greater equity, but rather explicitly acknowledge the resilience of inequality and group hierarchy even in the face of both bureaucratic formalization and social structural changes.
Finally, we recognize that it may be premature to draw conclusions about the niche status of the public sector for African Americans. Further empirical work is needed on this critical issue. To be sure, a wider range of socioeconomic outcomes should be assessed. Worthy of investigation, for instance, would be promotion/occupational mobility, access to reward-relevant structural characteristics of jobs such as supervisory responsibility as well forms of job displacement (e.g., layoffs, fires), all of which represent ongoing bases of racial inequality (Smith 2002; Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey and 2012; Wilson and Roscigno 2010) .
Regardless of the outcome, researchers should be mindful of limitations in research designs. More direct evidence on the ways reforms matter in concrete work settings would be welcomed. This might be accomplished with qualitative or case analyses of particular work sites-qualitative and case analyses that are perhaps less valuable for understanding aggregate consequences, but that can shed substantive light on underlying practices, worker allocations, and effective or ineffective equal opportunity programs (see, for instance, Byron 2010; Kalev 2009; Roscigno 2007) .
Despite the need for further work, our analyses nevertheless capture racial inequalities and changes over time, examine them specifically as a function of private versus public sectoral dynamics and more specific new governance changes, and delineate through decomposition the weight of alternative explanations (accounted for in our modeling) versus likely discretionary/discriminatory processes that manifest under new governance. We hope that our findings will be a springboard and new focus for scholars of racial/ethnic inequality, work, and social change. Ideally, others will further consider shifts occurring within a host of institutions, organizations, and labor markets, and treat seriously the very real implications for present and future generations of racial/ethnic minorities in the United States. Data sources: IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010) and ASC (U.S. Census Bureau 2005 Bureau , 2007 . Note: Hourly wage calculated by dividing annual salary by 40 (hours per week); b ¼ real dollars. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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